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More than a “thumping.” That’s what George W. Bush called it when Democrats won majorities in both houses by gaining six Senate and 30 House seats in 2006. In Tuesday’s midterm elections, Democrats won majorities in both houses, gaining seven Senate seats, with chances at two more, and have gained or are ahead in 40 Republican House seats.
Trump likes to boast that he carried all seven target states in his 50% to 48% popular-vote reelection. This year, all seven - Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin - went Democratic.
Much - maybe nearly all - of this is Trump’s doing. His “Liberation Day” tariffs, and the frivolous way he kept adjusting tariffs up and down, clearly kept inflation up and produced no visible positive effect.
Trump’s insistence on slavish loyalty in selecting candidates has also cost Republicans dearly. His choices in Georgia (2021 and 2022) and Arizona (2020 and 2024), his failure to get candidates who lost by less than 1 percentage point across the finish line in Wisconsin and Michigan in 2024, and his picks this year in North Carolina, South Carolina and Texas have arguably cost the party nine Senate seats heading into 2027.
That’s the difference between a Democratic Senate with 54 or 55 seats and a Republican Senate with the same majority.
In the county returns, we see central-city counties post overwhelming Democratic percentages, suggesting a sweep of almost every precinct. We see Republican majorities in suburban and exurban counties atrophying in the Southeast and disappearing in Texas. We see Republican percentages holding up only in the most un-metropolitan rural counties.
We see some interesting regional patterns. In far northern states, Republican candidates for senator and governor did not lag as far behind Trump’s 2024 levels, perhaps for local reasons: Sen. Susan Collins’s (R-Maine) personal popularity, Democratic scandals in Minnesota, and Abdul El-Sayed’s divisiveness in Michigan kept Democrats from running more than 1, 3 and 4 points ahead of Kamala Harris.
Note also that nationally, there were significant Republican declines, by double digits, among Hispanics, Asians and “others” - groups among which Trump posted gains in 2024. Hispanics and Asians voted about 27% Republican in 2012 and 2016, 46% and 40% Republican, respectively, in 2024, and 35% and 29%, respectively, in 2026. Similarly, voters aged 18 to 29 showed increasing support for Trump in 2024 and sharply reduced levels in 2026.
This decline in Republican support wreaked havoc with the party’s efforts, urged on by Trump, to draw new congressional district lines in Republican-controlled states. These inspired similar efforts by Democrats, which in California proved successful, while declining Republican percentages among Hispanics produced “dummymanders” that backfired, especially in Texas and North Carolina.
Will those 2024 gains turn out to be a one time phenomenon? Or do they remain harbingers of a possible future? No one knows for sure, and voters themselves are poor prognosticators of their own future attitudes. But I suspect the big drop among these volatile groups — Hispanics and Asians tend to be younger than average - can be explained by a sense that the second-term Trump hasn’t lived up to his basic campaign promise.
This year’s vote is an attempt to put limits on the actions and vagaries of a disappointing incumbent president.
Are we looking at the beginning of a political realignment? Toward some period of Democratic dominance rather than the two-party parity we’ve enjoyed (or endured) since 1994?
I’m not so sure. It could turn out to be, but that depends on political decisions that have not yet been made and exogenous events (macroeconomic trends, technological advance, wars) that have not yet occurred. This year’s results sit just at the outer limits of the two-party parity we have enjoyed (or endured) since the presidential election of 1992 and the congressional elections of 1994.